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Abstract The promotion of new high-potential
business ventures and venture capital is of critical
importance to economic growth. Well-considered
policies can profoundly influence such opportunities,
but many public initiatives are misguided. This article
reviews the evidence behind these claims, as well as
the criteria that can delineate appropriate and inap-
propriate policies towards the promotion of venture
capital and high-potential entrepreneurship.
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1 Introduction
Silicon Valley, Singapore, Tel Aviv—the global hubs
of entrepreneurial activity all bear the marks of
government investment. However, for every success-
ful public intervention spurring entrepreneurial activ-
ity, there are many failed efforts, wasting untold
billions in taxpayer dollars. When has governmental
sponsorship succeeded in boosting growth, and when
has it fallen terribly short? Should government be
involved in such undertakings at all? These issues are
particularly timely, given the many billions of dollars
that governments are spending worldwide to prop up
troubled industries such as automobiles, as well as the
urgent public efforts to encourage ‘‘green shoots’’ in
areas such as clean-tech in the hope of stimulating
economic recovery.
Programs to boost new ventures might seem like
an esoteric corner of public policy, far less important
than the big issues of war and peace and health
benefits, not to mention the rescue of giant firms that
are on the ropes, but this perception can be mislead-
ing because of the magnitude of changes that can
occur when venture programs are done well.
2 The contrasting cases
To understand their importance, we can contrast
Jamaica and Singapore.1 Both are relatively tiny
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states, with under 5,000,000 residents apiece. Upon
Singapore’s independence in 1965—3 years after
Jamaica’s own establishment as a nation—the two
nations were about equal in wealth: the gross
domestic product (in 2006 US dollars) was $2,850
per person in Jamaica, slightly higher than Singa-
pore’s $2,650. Both nations had a centrally located
port, a tradition of British colonial rule, and govern-
ments with a strong capitalist orientation. (Jamaica,
in addition, had plentiful natural resources and a
robust tourist industry.) However, four decades later,
their standing was dramatically different: Singapore
had climbed to a per capita GDP of $31,400 (2006
data, in current dollars), while Jamaica’s figure was
only $4,800.2
What accounts for this amazing difference in
growth rates? There are many explanations: soon
after independence, Singapore aggressively invested
in infrastructure such as its port, subsidized its system
of education, maintained an open and corruption-free
economy, and established sovereign wealth funds that
made a wide variety of investments. It has also
benefited from a strategic position on the key sea
lanes heading to and from East Asia. Jamaica,
meanwhile, spent many years mired in political
instability, particularly the disastrous administration
of Michael Manley during the 1970s. Dramatic shifts
from a market economy to a socialist orientation and
back again, with the attendant inflation, economic
instability, crippling public debt, and violence, made
development and implementation of a consistent
long-run economic policy difficult.
Thus, in explaining Singapore’s economic growth,
it is hard not to give considerable credit to its policies
toward entrepreneurship. The government has exper-
imented with a wide variety of efforts to develop an
entrepreneurial sector:
• The provision of public funds for venture inves-
tors seeking to locate in the city-state
• Subsidies for firms in targeted technologies
• Encouragement of potential entrepreneurs and
mentoring for fledgling ventures
• Subsidies for leading biotechnology researchers
to move their laboratories to Singapore
• Awards for failed entrepreneurs (with a hope of
encouraging risk-taking)
While much of the initial growth in Singapore can
be attributed to sound macroeconomic policies,
political stability, and various other factors, the
nation’s entrepreneurship initiatives have played an
increasingly important role in stimulating growth.
The contrast with Jamaica is striking. Jamaica has
long had a high rate of subsistence entrepreneurship;
for instance, the 2006 Global Entrepreneurship
Monitor survey placed it among the highest of the
42 nations it examined in various rates of entrepre-
neurial activity (Skeete et al. 2007). However, other
data collected by the Monitor—and corroborated in
anecdotal accounts—suggests that early-stage entre-
preneurship is translated into full-fledged business
activity at a very low rate. On this measure, the island
nation ranked among the lowest nations (28th among
the 35 countries ranked by GEM in 2005 (Glasgow
et al. 2006)).
Some of the reasons for the inability of Jamaican
entrepreneurs to grow can be seen in the World
Bank’s reports on the barriers to entrepreneurs. The
‘‘Doing Business’’ series assesses, across 178 coun-
tries, the obstacles faced by entrepreneurs in
performing various standardized tasks (thereby
avoiding some of the subjectivity associated with
other attempts to rank entrepreneurship).
In several critical indicators, Jamaica ranked
extremely low in the World Bank’s 2008 analysis
(International Finance Corporation 2010a). These
suggest some of the barriers that hold back the
growth of entrepreneurial enterprises:
• Of the 178 countries studied, Jamaica ranked
170th in the burden of complying with tax
regulations. The ranking reflects not just the cost
of taxes themselves, but also the administrative
burdens associated with complying with the tax
code. The World Bank’s analysis suggests that the
total cost of complying with all tax laws in
Jamaica amounts to just over one-half of gross
profits for the typical entrepreneur. Numerous
studies have suggested that one of the most
important sources of financing for the typical
entrepreneur is cash flow generated by the
business itself, which is plowed back into the
business. If so much of entrepreneurs’ income is
going to meet tax obligations, business owners are
2 These figures are computed using the Central Intelligence
Agency (2008), Council of Economic Advisors, Executive




unlikely to have the resources to invest in their
enterprises. By way of contrast, Singapore ranked
second worldwide, with a burden of just 23%
(International Finance Corporation 2010b).
• Similarly, when the cost of registering property is
compared, Jamaica ranked 108th out of 178: the
cost of registering property was equal to 13.5% of
the value of the property. (By comparison, the
ratio in the USA is 0.5% of the value, Interna-
tional Finance Corporation 2010c.) The high cost
of registering property means that fewer people
register their holdings, which in turn leads to less
secure property rights. Most critically, entrepre-
neurs who do not hold a firm legal title to property
are unlikely to be able to borrow against this
holding from a bank. Once again, this comparison
suggests that entrepreneurs have fewer resources
for growing their enterprises.
One of the most visible manifestations of this lack
of activity may be in Jamaica’s productivity: from
1973 to 2007, the nation actually experienced neg-
ative productivity growth (Henry 2006).
Making this poor performance even more striking
is the fact that, during this period, the developed
nations experienced substantial growth through the
implementation of information technology, and many
developing markets experienced even faster growth
as they caught up with technologies adopted earlier in
the West.
This disparity may change in future years: Jamaica
enjoyed a surge in income with the rise of energy and
commodity prices, and the most recent prime minis-
ters have shown greater awareness of, and willingness
to lower, barriers to entrepreneurship. However, the
disparate experiences of Singapore and Jamaica over
the past four decades demonstrate why all of us
should care about public efforts to stimulate
entrepreneurship.
Thus, while the dollars spent each year on
entrepreneurship programs—though significant on
an absolute basis—pale when compared with defense
and health care expenditures, the picture changes
when we consider the long-run consequences of
policies that facilitate or hinder the development of a
venture sector, i.e., the impact on national prosperity
of a vital entrepreneurial climate. In the long run, the
significance of entrepreneurial policies looms much
larger.
3 A more systematic view
When we look at the academic literature, we find
arguments for and against government interventions
to stimulate entrepreneurship. The rationales for
government investment rest on three pillars.
First, the role of technological innovation as a spur
for economic growth is now widely recognized.
Economists have documented the strong connection
between technological progress and economic pros-
perity, both across nations and over time. This insight
grew out of studies done by the pioneering student of
technological change, Morris Abramowitz (1956). He
realized that there are ultimately only two ways of
increasing the output of the economy: (1) increasing
the number of inputs that go into the productive
process (e.g., by having workers stay employed until
the age of 67, instead of retiring at 62), or (2)
developing new ways to get more output from the
same inputs. Abramowitz measured the growth in the
output of the US economy between 1870 and 1950—
the amount of material goods and services produced—
and then computed the increase in inputs (especially
labor and financial capital) over the same time period.
To be sure, this was an imprecise exercise: he needed
to make assumptions about the growth in the
economic impact of these input measures. After
undertaking this analysis, he discovered that growth
of inputs between 1870 and 1950 could account for
only about 15% of the actual growth in the output of
the economy. The remaining 85% could not be
explained through the growth of inputs. Instead, the
increased economic activity stemmed from innova-
tions in getting more stuff from the same inputs.
Other economists in the late 1950s and 1960s
undertook similar exercises. These studies differed in
methodologies, economic sectors, and time periods,
but the results were similar. Most notably, Robert
Solow, who later won a Nobel Prize for this work,
identified an almost identical ‘‘residual’’ of about
85% (Solow 1957). The results were so striking
because most economists for the previous 200 years
had been building models in which economic growth
was treated as if it were primarily a matter of adding
more inputs: if you just had more people and dollars,
more output would invariably result.
Instead, these studies suggested, the crucial driver
of growth was changes in the ways inputs were used.
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The magnitude of this unexplained growth, and the
fact that it was exposed by researchers using widely
divergent methodologies, persuaded most economists
that innovation was a major force in the growth of
output.
In the decades since the 1950s, economists and
policymakers have documented the relationship
between innovation—whether new scientific discov-
eries or incremental changes in the way that factories
and service businesses work—and increases in eco-
nomic prosperity. Not just identifying an unexplained
‘‘residual,’’ studies have documented the positive
effects of technological progress in areas such as
information technology. Thus, an essential question
for the economic future of a country is not only what
it produces, but how it goes about producing it.
This relationship between innovation and growth
has been recognized by many governments. From the
European Union—which has targeted increasing
research spending as a key goal in the next few
years—to emerging economies such as China, leaders
have embraced the notion that innovation is critical to
growth.
Second, academic research has highlighted the role
of entrepreneurship and venture capital in stimulating
innovation. Hundreds, if not thousands, of papers
have examined the relationship between firm size and
innovation.3 Much of this work has related measures
of innovative discoveries—for example, research and
development (R&D) expenditures, patents, or inven-
tions—to firm size. Initial studies were undertaken
using the largest manufacturing firms; more recent
works have employed larger samples and detailed
data (e.g., studies employing data on firms’ specific
lines of business). Despite the improved methodology
of recent studies, the results have remained incon-
clusive: the studies seem as likely to find a negative
as a positive relationship, and even when a positive
relationship between firm size and innovation has
been found, it has had little economic significance.
For instance, one study concluded that a doubling of
firm size increased the ratio of R&D to sales by only
0.2% (Cohen et al. 1987).
Whatever the relationship between a firm’s size
and its innovations, one of the relatively few things
that researchers can agree on is the critical role
played by new firms, or entrants, in many industries.
The role of start-ups in emerging industries has been
highlighted not just in many case studies but also in
systematic research. For instance, a study by Acs and
Audretsch (1988) examined which firms developed
some of the most important innovations of the 20th
century. They documented the central contribution of
new and small firms: these firms contributed almost
half the innovations they examined. However, they
found that the contribution of small firms was not
central in all industries. Rather, their role was a
function of industry conditions: it was greatest in
immature industries in which market power was
relatively unconcentrated. These findings suggest that
entrepreneurs and small firms play a key role in
observing where new technologies can meet custom-
ers’ needs, and rapidly introducing products.
Venture financiers and firms have developed tools
that are very well suited to the challenging task of
nurturing high-risk but promising new ideas. One
study estimates that, because of these tools, a single
dollar of venture capital generates as much innova-
tion as three dollars of traditional corporate research
and development. Venture capital and the entrepre-
neurs it funds will never supplant other wellsprings of
innovation, such as vibrant universities and corporate
research laboratories (in an ideal world, these com-
ponents of growth all feed each other). However, in
an innovative system, a healthy entrepreneurial sector
and venture capital industry will be important
contributors.
If this were the whole story, the case for public
involvement would be pretty compelling. However,
the case for public intervention rests as well on a third
leg: the argument that governments can effectively
promote entrepreneurship and venture capital, and
this is a much shakier assumption.
To be sure, entrepreneurial markets have features
that allow us to identify a natural role for government
in encouraging their evolution. Entrepreneurship is a
business in which there are increasing returns. To put
the point another way, it is far easier to found a start-
up if there are ten other entrepreneurs nearby. In
many respects, founders and venture capitalists
benefit from their peers; for instance, if entrepreneurs
are already active in the market, investors, employ-
ees, intermediaries such as lawyers and data provid-
ers, and the wider capital markets are likely to be
knowledgeable about the venturing process and what
3 The interested reader can turn to surveys by Azoulay and
Lerner (2010) and Cohen and Levin (1989).
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strategies, financing, support, and exit mechanisms it
requires. In the activities associated with entrepre-
neurship and venture capital, the actions of any one
group are likely to have positive spillovers—or, in the
language of economics, ‘‘externalities’’—for their
peers. It is in these types of settings that government
can often play a very positive role as a catalyst.
This observation is supported by numerous exam-
ples of government intervention that has triggered the
growth of a venture capital sector. For instance, the
Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) pro-
gram in the USA led to the formation of the
infrastructure for much of the modern venture capital
industry. Many of the early venture capital funds and
leading intermediaries in the industry—such as law
firms and data providers—began as organizations
oriented to the SBIC funds, and then gradually shifted
their focus to independent venture capitalists. Simi-
larly, public programs played an important role in
triggering the explosive growth of virtually every
other major venture market around the globe.
However, there are reasons to be cautious about
the efficacy of government intervention. In particular,
two well-documented problems can derail govern-
ment programs. First, they can simply get it wrong,
allocating funds and support in an inept or, even
worse, counterproductive manner. An extensive
literature has examined the factors that affect the
quality of governmental efforts in general, and
suggests that more competent programs are likelier
in nations that are wealthier, with more heteroge-
neous populations, and an English legal tradition.
Economists have also focused on a second prob-
lem, delineated in the theory of regulatory capture.
These writings suggest that private- and public-sector
entities will organize to capture direct and indirect
subsidies that the public sector hands out; for instance,
programs geared toward boosting nascent entrepre-
neurs may instead end up boosting cronies of the
nation’s rulers or legislators. The annals of govern-
ment venturing programs abound with examples of
efforts that have been hijacked in such a manner.
A few instances of both problems are as follows:
• In its haste to roll out the Small Business Invest-
ment Company program in the early 1960s, the US
Small Business Administration chartered—and
funded—hundreds of funds whose managers were
incompetent or crooked.
• The incubators taking part in Australia’s 1999
Building on Information Technology Strengths
(BITS) program frequently captured the lion’s
share of the subsidies aimed toward entrepre-
neurs, by forcing the young firms to purchase
their own overpriced services.
• Malaysia opened a massive BioValley complex in
2005 with little forethought about whether there
would be demand for the facility. The facility
soon became known as the ‘‘Valley of the Bio-
Ghosts.’’
• UK Labour and Conservative governments sub-
sidized and gave exclusive rights in the 1980s to
the biotechnology firm Celltech, whose manage-
ment team was manifestly incapable of exploiting
those resources.
• Norway squandered much of its oil wealth in the
1970s and 1980s propping up failing ventures and
funding ill-conceived new businesses begun by
relatives of parliamentarians and bureaucrats.
4 The right steps
What public policies are most effective in encourag-
ing the growth of a venture economy? Before turning
to general principles, these can be illustrated by
considering two success stories.
In June 1992, the Israeli government established
Yozma Venture Capital Ltd., a US $100 million fund
wholly owned by the public sector. At the time, there
was a single venture fund active in the nation, Athena
Venture Partners. While there were certainly well-
trained engineers in the nation working on promising
technologies, entrepreneurs (and would-be company
founders) were suspicious of venture investors. This
reluctance was based in part on their interactions with
the pioneering venture capitalists in the nation, as
well as their general skepticism about selling equity
to unaffiliated parties. Instead, they preferred to rely
on bank debt for financing. The only problem, of
course, was that such financing was rarely available
for young, risky ventures.
The key goal of Yozma was to bring foreign
venture capitalists’ investment expertise and network
of contacts to Israel. The need for this assistance was
highlighted by the failure of the nation’s earlier
efforts to promote high-technology entrepreneurship.
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One assessment concluded that fully 60% of the
entrepreneurs in prior programs had been successful
in meeting their technical goals but nonetheless failed
because the entrepreneurs were unable to market their
products or raise capital for further development
(Jerusalem Institute of Management 1987). Foreign
expertise was seen as key to overcoming this
problem.
Accordingly, Yozma actively discouraged Israeli
financiers from participating in its programs. Rather,
the focus was on getting foreign venture investors to
commit capital for Israeli entrepreneurs. The govern-
ment provided matching funds to investors, typically
US $8 million of a US $20 million fund. The venture
fund was given the right to buy back the government
stake within the first 5 years for the initial value plus
a preset interest rate of roughly 5–7%. Thus the
incentives of Yozma meant that the government
provided an added incentive to the venture fund if the
investments proved successful. Moreover, learning
from the nation’s misadventures during earlier pro-
grams to stimulate the venture industry—when
cumbersome application procedures and burdensome
reporting requirements discouraged participation—
the administration of the program was deliberately
made simple.
In addition to the financial incentives, the project
adopted a legal structure for the venture funds that
foreign investors would be comfortable with.
Included were features such as a 10-year fund life,
limited partnerships modeled after the Delaware
partnerships that are standard practice in the USA
and elsewhere, and ‘‘flow-through’’ tax status. Had
the government not adopted these features—and the
Israeli Treasury department resisted them before
acquiescing under pressure—it is unlikely that the
program would have succeeded in attracting foreign
investors.
The Yozma program delivered beyond the wildest
dreams of the founders. Ten groups took advantage of
this offer, mostly from the USA, Western Europe,
and Japan. Many of the original Yozma funds,
including Gemini and Walden Ventures, earned
spectacular returns and served as precursors to larger,
follow-on funds. Moreover, many of the local
partners recruited by the overseas venture capitalists
were able to spin off and establish their own firms,
which global venture capitalists were eager to fund
because of their impressive track records. (A Yozma
‘‘alumni club’’ allows groups to learn from each
others’ experiences while making these transitions.)
One decade after the program’s inception, the ten
original Yozma groups were managing Israeli funds
totaling US $2.9 billion, and the Israeli venture
market had expanded to include 60 groups managing
approximately US $10 billion (Erlich 2003). In most
tabulations, Tel Aviv has surpassed Boston as the
urban area with the most venture activity after San
Francisco.
Another, albeit younger and less conclusive,
success is the New Zealand Venture Investment
Fund (NZVIF).4 In late 1999 the newly elected Prime
Minister, Helen Clark, realized that New Zealand
faced a fundamental problem and needed to change.
In particular, she was concerned that New Zealand’s
economy depended critically on production and
exporting of commodities. The nation’s position in
the knowledge-based industries was weak, and its
living standards were steadily falling relative to the
other major developed nations.
A critical area that her government targeted was
enhancing innovation, and encouraging venture cap-
ital was a critical aspect of this goal. In light of
limited activity in the local market, the government
sought to accelerate the growth of the New Zealand
venture capital market through co-investment with
private investors and related market development
activities. After a careful review of other models,
the government adopted a so-called fund-of-funds
approach, whereby it made investments in private
venture capital fund managers.
Prior to any investments being made, NZVIF was
structured as a stand-alone company, which ensured
that the government could distance itself from risk
and liability for the investments made. This approach
also ensured distance and independence from deci-
sions about appointment of venture capital fund
managers and from individual investment decisions.
These investments were structured as equity
(to minimize possible distortions) and could be
bought out by the investors. Government investments
in the funds were on the same terms as those of
private investors, except that each fund was provided
with an option exercisable up to the end of the fifth
year of the fund to buy out the NZVIF investment on




the basis of capital plus interest only (that is, other
investors would receive any upside above this
amount).
Deliberately, the project’s designers asked for no
special rights. The fund managers were given
responsibility for making and managing investments
without government interference. NZVIF leaders
participated in investor governance decisions on the
same terms as private investors, with the same voting
rights. Investor governance arrangements reflected
current market practice. The funds were geared
toward investors in early-stage companies, and every
dollar had to be matched with two dollars from the
private sector.
NZVIF’s decision to invest in a fund is made
following completion of an extensive selection and
due diligence process, undertaken by the fund
manager, to determine whether the fund proposal is
‘‘investment grade.’’ An important process is the
establishment of the fund through a process of
competitive selection. The initial screening is done
by the staff, followed by an outside assessment by an
independent specialist private equity advisor. A
standard methodology and fixed criteria are used to
assess and rank all applications. In many cases, the
staff work actively with teams of would-be venture
fund managers to help them make their proposals
more attractive (for instance, helping them identify
prospective additional individuals who can contribute
needed experience). This is necessitated by the
limited supply of New Zealand-based funds. Follow-
ing the completion of external due diligence, the
NZVIF board selects those applicants with whom it
wishes to negotiate investment terms.
As part of the negotiations, a monitoring and
reporting framework is agreed with each NZVIF seed
fund manager. This enables NZVIF to collect the
economic and financial data it needs for the required
regular reports on the performance of each fund and
the impact of the program. This also enables NZVIF to
monitor each fund to ensure it is compliant with
its investment agreement and investor governance
requirements. Once fund agreements are finalized,
investment activity commences. While the program is
still young, its success to date has been very promising.
More generally, three principles in particular seem
critical as guide-posts:
Remember that entrepreneurial activity does not
exist in a vacuum. Entrepreneurs are tremendously
dependent on their partners. Without experienced
lawyers able to negotiate agreements, skilled mar-
keting gurus and engineers who are willing to work
for low wages and a handful of stock options, and
customers who are willing to take a chance on a
young firm, success is unlikely. However, despite the
importance of the entrepreneurial environment, in
many cases government officials hand out money
without thinking about barriers other than money that
entrepreneurs face. In some cases, crucial aspects of
the entrepreneurial environment may seem tangential,
for instance, the importance of robust public markets
for young firms as a spur to venture investment. It is
critical to take a broad view and address not just the
availability of capital but also other components of a
productive arena in which entrepreneurs could
operate.
Let the market provide direction. The two success-
ful efforts we have highlighted above, the Israeli
Yozma program and the New Zealand Venture
Investment Fund, differed in their details: the former
was geared toward attracting foreign venture inves-
tors; the latter encouraged locally based, early-stage
funds. However, they shared a central element: each
used matching funds to determine where public
subsidies should go. In using the market for guidance,
policymakers should keep in mind that these initiatives
should not compete with independent venture funds or
finance substandard firms that cannot raise private
capital. Emulating successful initiatives in the past,
programs should require that a substantial amount of
funds be raised from nonpublic sources. To be sure, in
encouraging seed companies and groups, leaders
should be aware that extensive intervention may be
needed before they are ‘‘fund-able.’’ Programs may
need to work closely with the organizations to refine
strategies, recruit additional partners (perhaps even
from other regions), and identify potential investors.
However, only through a market-based system are the
critical flaws that have doomed so many earlier
programs likely to be avoided.
Resist the temptation to overengineer. In many
instances, government requirements that limit the
flexibility of entrepreneurs and venture investors have
been detrimental. It is tempting to add restrictions on
several dimensions, for instance: the locations in
which the firms can operate, the type of securities
venture investors can use, and the evolution of the
firms (e.g., restrictions on acquisitions or secondary
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sales of stock). Government programs should eschew
such efforts to micromanage the entrepreneurial
process. While it is natural to expect that firms and
groups receiving subsidies will retain a local presence
or continue to target the local region for investments,
these requirements should be as minimal as possible.
We can also highlight a few other points that are
important to success:
• Leverage the local academic scientific and
research base. One particular precondition to
entrepreneurship deserves special mention: in
many regions of the world, there is a mismatch
between the low level of entrepreneurial activity
and venture capital financing, on the one hand,
and the strength of the scientific and research
base, on the other. The role of technology transfer
offices is absolutely critical here. Effective offices
do not just license technologies but also educate
nascent academic entrepreneurs and introduce
them to venture investors. Building the capabil-
ities of local technology transfer offices, and
training both potential academic entrepreneurs
and technology transfer personnel in the process
of new firm formation, is essential. All too often,
technology transfer offices are encouraged to
maximize the short-run return from licensing
transactions. This leads to an emphasis on trans-
actions with established corporations that can
make substantial up-front payments, even though
licensing new technologies to start-ups can yield
substantial returns in the long run, both to the
institution and to the region as a whole. It is
important that policymakers think seriously about
the way in which technology transfer is being
undertaken, the incentives being offered, and their
consequences.
• Respect the need for conformity to global stan-
dards. It is natural to want to hold onto long-
standing approaches in matters such as securities
regulation and taxes. In many cases, these
approaches have evolved to address specific
problems, and have proven to be effective.
Nevertheless, there is a strong case for adopting
the de facto global standards. Global institutional
investors and venture funds are likely to be
discouraged if customary partnership and pre-
ferred stock structures cannot be employed in a
given nation. Even if a perfectly good alternative
exists, they may be unwilling to devote the time
and resources to explore it. Unless the nation is
one such as China—where global investors feel
compelled to master the system, no matter how
complex, owing to the size of the market oppor-
tunity—policymakers should allow transactions
that conform to the models widely accepted as
best practice.
• Recognize the long lead times associated with
public venture initiatives. One of the common
failings of public entrepreneurship and venture
capital initiatives has been impatience. Building an
entrepreneurial sector is a long-run endeavor, not
an overnight accomplishment. Programs that have
initial promise should be given time to prove their
merits. Far too often, promising initiatives have
been abandoned on the basis of partial (and often,
not the most critical) indicators, for instance, low
interim rates of return of initial participants.
Impatience—or creating rules that force program
participants to focus on short-run returns—is a
recipe for failure.
• Avoid initiatives that are too large or too small.
Policymakers must walk a tightrope in finding the
appropriate size for venture initiatives. Too small
a program will do little to improve the environ-
ment for pioneering entrepreneurs and venture
funds. Moreover, inflated expectations, out of
proportion to the money invested, may create a
backlash that impedes future efforts. However,
programs that are too substantial can swamp local
markets. The imbalance between plentiful capital
and limited opportunities may introduce patholo-
gies. Unsuccessful programs, such as the Cana-
dian Labor Fund Program, not only backed
incompetent groups that did little to spur entre-
preneurship, but it crowded out some of the most
knowledgeable local investors.
• Understand the importance of global intercon-
nections. Entrepreneurship and venture capital are
emerging as global enterprises. This evolution has
two important consequences. First, no matter how
eager policymakers are to encourage activity in
their own backyard, they must realize that, to be
successful, firms must have a multinational pres-
ence. Efforts to restrict firms to hiring and
manufacturing locally are likely to be self-
defeating. Second, it is important to involve
overseas investors as much as feasible. Local
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companies can benefit from relationships with
funds based elsewhere but investing capital
locally. Moreover, successful investments will
attract more overseas capital. In addition, local
affiliates of a fund based elsewhere—having a
successful track record—will gain the credibility
they need to raise their own funds. That being
said, when public funds subsidize activities by
overseas parties, officials should obtain commit-
ments from these entrepreneurs and groups to
recruit personnel to be resident locally, and to
have partners based elsewhere be involved with
the management of the local groups.
• Institutionalize careful evaluations of initiatives.
All too often, in the rush to boost entrepreneur-
ship, policymakers make no provision for the
evaluation of programs. The future of initiatives
should be determined by their success or failure in
meeting their goals, rather than other consider-
ations (such as the vehemence with which sup-
porters argue for their continuation). Careful
program evaluations will help ensure better deci-
sions. These evaluations should consider not just
the individual funds and companies participating
in the programs, but also the broader context.
• Realize that programs need creativity and flex-
ibility. Too often, public venturing initiatives are
like the pock-faced villain in a horror film—as
much as one tries, he cannot be killed off. Their
seeming immortality reflects the capture problem
discussed above: powerful vested interests coa-
lesce behind initiatives, making them impossible
to get rid of. The nations that have been most
successful in public programs have been willing
to end those that are not doing well, and to
substitute other incentives. Even more power-
fully, they have been willing to end programs on
the grounds that they are too successful and
hence no longer in need of public funding.
Moreover, program rules may have to evolve,
even if important classes of participants are
thereby eliminated. If government is going to be
in the business of promoting entrepreneurship, it
needs some entrepreneurial qualities itself.
• Recognize that ‘‘agency problems’’ are universal
and take steps to minimize their danger. The
‘‘horror stories’’ above illustrate that the tempta-
tions to direct public subsidies in ways not
intended are not confined to any region, political
system or ethnicity. While we might wish that
human beings everywhere would confine them-
selves to maximizing public welfare, selfish
interest all too often rears its ugly head. In
designing public programs to promote venture
capital and entrepreneurship, such behavior
should be limited as far as possible. Defining
and adhering to clear strategies and procedures
for venture initiatives, creating a firewall between
elected officials and program administrators, and
careful assessments of the program can help limit
self-serving behavior.
• Make education an important part of the mixture.
The emphasis on education should have at least
three dimensions:
– The first is building the understanding of
outsiders about the local market’s potential.
One of the critical barriers to the willingness
of venture investors to invest in a given nation
is lack of information. If one visits a racetrack
for the first time, it is always nice to know
whether the track favors front-runners or late
closers, and who the hot local jockeys are. In
the same way, institutions feel more comfort-
able investing if they have information about
the level of entrepreneurial activity in local
markets, the outcomes of the investments, and
so forth. An important role that government
can play is gathering this information, or else
encouraging (and perhaps funding) a local
trade association to do so.
– Second, educating entrepreneurs is a critical
process. In many emerging venture markets,
entrepreneurs may have a great deal of
confidence, but relatively little understanding
of the expectations of top-tier private inves-
tors, potential strategic partners, and invest-
ment bankers. The more that can be done to
fill these gaps, the better.
– Finally, a broad-based understanding in the
public sector of the challenges of entrepre-
neurial and venture capital development is
very helpful. As we have repeatedly high-
lighted, policymakers have made expensive
errors out of a lack of understanding of how
these markets really work.
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5 Concluding remarks
This essay explores the appropriate role for public
policy in the promotion of venture capital and high-
potential entrepreneurship. The case for supporting
these institutions lies in the importance of innovation
in stimulating economic growth, the role of entre-
preneurial firms as an engine of innovation, and the
historical evidence and theoretical arguments that
suggest that governments can play a role in promot-
ing entrepreneurship. At the same time, many barriers
exist to effective implementation of public programs
with these goals. The article explores the frequently
encountered challenges and the principles that can
lead to more effective programs.
The promotion of new business ventures is of
critical importance to all of us. While the challenges
facing government initiatives may seem arcane and
technical, well-considered policies are likely to
profoundly influence our opportunities, as well as
those of our children and grandchildren. Misguided
policies, unfortunately, will also help determine the
future. However challenging the encouragement of
entrepreneurship may seem, it is truly too important
to be left to policy specialists.
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